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HE ROMAN CA'l'HOl.dC WELPARB CORPORATION
UF SAN l'1 HA:·:CISCO
v.
CITY OI'' PIEDMONT
of Ordinances.in
and not
,1 ··stiJ!n hle exercise of
[2] !d.-Zoning-Legislative Disf::etion and Court
favor of the
of the exercise of polict>
diil'cr from the determination
is a
has substantial relation to the pul: · :c
morals or
the
meas:;re will be deemed to be
of the police power.
[3] Schools-Parents-Rights.--Parents have the
to send
their children to private schools, rather than public ones, which
are located in their mmwdiate
or gerwral neigllhorhood.
[~a, 4b] :Municipal Corporations-Zoning-Subjects of Regulation
-Schools.--An ordinance is invalid which exclude~ private
schools from an area in which public schools are not excluded.
a private school not being inimical to the public welfare in
the absence of any showing of exceptional circumstances concerning the pnrticular location of such school.
[5] Schools-Private Schools.-A private school is not free from
control as distinguished from the control exercised over public
schools (see Ed. Code, ~
that a private school
shall be taught in English and shall offer instruction in the
branches of study required in public schools), and a city,
under its police power, can insure the preservation of the
public peace and of private property.
[6] Id.-Parents-Rights.-'l'he state's interest in public education
docs not empower the Legislature to
school children to
receive instruction from public teachers only, since it would
thereby take away the right of parents to dirPct the upbringing
and educntion of ehildr{'n under thPir control.

PHOC.BEDING in mandamus to compel the issuance of a
building permit. Writ granted.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 158 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Zoning, § 14 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corpol'ations, ~ 144; [2]
Municipnl Corporations,§ 145; [3, 6j Schools,§ 108; l4J Municipal
Corporations, § 159; [ 5 J Schools, § 8.
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Burke for Petitioner.

Irving Shore, Marvel Shore, Lmvrcnce Speiser, Philip
Adams, Wayne M. Collins, William Coblentz, Kamina K.
Gupta, Ruth Church Gupta,
G. Olshauseu, Albert C.
Agnew, Ira \V. Barr, Leo Pfeffer and Philip Baum as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
J. Marcus Hardin,
Respondents.

Attorney, and Cyril Viadro for

J. W. 0 'Neill as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
CARTER, J.-This is a proceeding in mandamus by petitioner, the Roman Catholic \V elfare Corporation of San
Francisco, to compel the issuance of a building permit for
the construction of a building· to be used for an elementary
school in which secular and religious subjects were to be
taught. 'l'he building permit was denied on the sole ground
that a zoning ordinance of the city of Piedmont prohibited
the construction of any school within Zone A, where petitioner's land is located, except public schools under the jurisdiction of the board of education of the city of Piedmont.
In Zone A, there are three elementary schools, one junior
high school and one high school, all under the jurisdiction
of the board of education of the city. The ordinance in question was passed by the city council and approved by a large
majority of the voters at a general election.
There is only one question involved: Whether the city of
Piedmont may, by ordinance, constitutionally prevent the
construction of a building to be used for private school purposes in an area where public schools are located.
[1] "It is well settled that zoning ordinances, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, constitute
a justifiable exercise of police power, . . . [2] Every intendment is in favor of the validity of the exercise of police
power, and, even though a court might differ from the determination of the legislative body, if there is a reasonable basis
for the belief that the establishment of a strictly residential
district has substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare, the zoning measure will be deemed
to be within the purview of the police power.'' (Wilkins v.
City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 337 [171 P.2d 542].)
We must then determine whether, in the instant case, there
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is a reasonable basiil for the ordinance
schools in an area where public schools are permitted. Petitioner acquired its property subsequent to the time the ordinance was passed. It is conceded that the question is one
of first impression in this state.
The record shows that Zone A is
of 98.7 per cent
of the entire area of the city of Piedmont and is populated
approximately 98.2 per cent of the entire
of
the
of Piedmont. Zone B has .59 per cent of the area
of the city and consists of three
parcels of
land none of which is unimproved; Zone C has .24 per cent
of tlw area of the city and consists of 10 noncontiguous
parcels of land none of 'vhich is unimproved; Zone D has
.46 per cent of the total area of the city and cm.tsists of five
noncontiguous parcels of land two of which are unimproved.
Private schools are permitted in Zones B. C, and D. The
land owned by petitioner and on which it is contemplated
the private school in question will be constructed is immediately adjacent to Corpus Christi (Homan Catholic) Church.
Petitioner argues that the ordinance in question is unconstitutional and void because of its arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against private schools. Respondrnts, on
the other hand, argue that the ordinance constitutes a reasonable exercise of tlJe city's police power in that the city is
primarily residential in character, that in excluding private
schools, the city council could consider such factors as the
character of the district, the conservation of property values,
public opinion, matters affecting traffic control, size of streets,
parking, noise, fire protection, overburdening of water mains
and sewers, and the peace, comfort and quiet of the district.
It is contended that private schools may be located in the
three remaining zones; that the proposed school would be
attended by children from both Oaldand (the adjacent city)
and Piedmont and perhaps children from other communities
while the public schools in the zone would be attended by
only Piedmont children and that the larger number of children
would bring about more noise and traffic hazards with the
necessity for more traffic control. Respondents rely on State
v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91 [65 N.W.2d 43, 47], a mandamus action
by a private, nonprofit corporation to compel the city building
inspector to issue a permit for the construction of a private
high school in a class ''A'' residential zone where public
schools were permitted. It was there held, with two justices
dissenting, that ''. . . tangible differences material to the
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which sustain the
the schools. 'ro
of 'private.' The
serve different

C.2d
out
between
the antithesis
They
The

ent.

stand on
ing ordinances,-the
and morals,
as laid down
section 62.23 (7)
and developed
by respondent's brief. we may not say that the two schools
differ. But when we come to 'the promotion of the general
welfare of th<·
there's the rub.' The public school has the same features objectionable to the surrounding area as a private one, but it has. also, a virtue which the
other lacks, namely, that it is located to serve and does serve
that area without discrimination. Whether the private school
is sectarian or commercial,
it now complains of discrimination, in its services it discriminates and the public
school does not. Anyone in the district of fit ag·e and educational qualifications may attend the pnblic high school. It
is his right. He has no comparable rig·ht to attend a private
school. To go tl1ere he must meet additional standards over
which the public neither has nor should have control. The
private school imposes on the
all the disadvantages
of the public school but does not compensate the community
in the same manner or to the same extent. If the private
school does not make the same contribution to public welfare
this difference may be taken into consideration by the legislative body in
its ordinance. If education offered
by a school to the residents of an area without discrimination
is considered by the eouncil to compensate for the admitted
drawbacks to its presence there, that school may be permitted
a location ;vhich is denied to another school which does not
match the
and we cannot say that such a distinction
is arbitrary or unreasonable or that such discrimination between the tvw schools lacks foundation in a difference which
bears a 'fair, substantial, reasonable and just relation' to
the promotion of the general welfare of the community, which
is the statutory purpose of zoning laws in general and of
the ordinance in question." The dissenting opinion pointed

1955]

RoMAN CATIT. ETc.
[-15 C2d

~25;

CoRP. v.

CrTY OF

PrEmroxT

~12D

289 P.2d 4361

out that the primary purpose of all schools was to educate
the students ; that the state was interested in having educated
c·hildren to the end that they eventually become good citizens;
that private schools as well as public ones promote the general
welfare and that there was no substantial difference in the
purpose which they served. 'l'he dissenting opinion quoted
from the case of Catholic Bishop
Chicago v. Kingery, 371
Ill. 257 [20 N.E.2d 583, 584], where it was said: "We fail
to perceive to what degree a catholie school of this type will
be more detrimental or dangerous to the public health than
a public school. It is not pointed out to us just how the
pupils in attendance at the parochial school are any more
likely to jeopardize the public safety than the public sehool
pupils. Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the prospective
students of the new school will seriously undermine the general welfare. As a matter of fact such a school, conducted
in aecordance with the educational requirements established
by State educational authorities, is promotive of the general
welfare."
Petitioner argues that parents have the basic constitutional
right to have their children educated in schools of their own
choice, subject to reasonable regulations as to subjects required to be taught, manner of instruction, etc. In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 [ 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed.
1070, 39 A.L.R. 468], it was held that the Act of 1922 which
required every parent. guardian, etc. of a child between 8
and 16 years to send him "to a public school for the period
of time a public school shall be held during the current year"
''. . . unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to aceept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high dutr. to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations." Respondents Reek to distinguish the Pierce case on the gronnd tlJat it involved an
established business conducted for a substantial profit which
would be destroyed had the act in question been enforced;
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and on the ground that the Oregon statute sought to keep
private schools out of the entire State of Oregon. It is
argued that here in the event the ordinance is enforced,
Piedmont parents will continue to send their children to
those private schools which are in existence outside the city
limits of Piedmont. Respondents' argument is based on the
theory that in the Pierce case it was considered unreasonable
to expect Oregon parents to send their children out of the
state to attend private schools while it is not unreasonable
to expect PiedmonJ parents to send their children to private
schools outside the city limits. This begs the question.
[3] Parents have the right to send their children to private
schools, rather than public ones, which are located in their
immediate locality or general neighborhood. It is also argued
by the city that even the constitutional right of parents to
educate their children as they choose (Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, supra, 268 U.S. 510) must yield to a reasonable exercise of the police power. This argument adds nothing to the
ones heretofore made. The question of the reasonableness of
the ordinance is the primary one involved here.
In Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (2d eel.), volume 1,
section 57, at page 89, it is said : "In the light of a well known
Illinois decision [Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kinget·y, 371
Ill. 257 (20 N.E.2d 583)] affecting discrimination between
classes of schools permitted in certain zones, it is well to
again state the general principle that a zoning ordinance
restricting the property rights of an individual without having any direct or substantial relationship to the promotion
of the public health, safety, morals or welfare, is invalid.
In this case a village zoning ordinance expressly permitting
the maintenance of public schools but impliedly prohibiting
private or parochial schools in a residential section was
declared to be invalid as having no substantial relationship to
the promotion of the public health, safety, morals or welfare,
the court holding that the restriction amounted to a capricious
invasion of property rights.
''There are many other cases which have been reported
that uniformly follow this rule that discrimination between
public and private schools will not be tolerated. . . . ''
In Mooney v. ViUage of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389 [53
N.W.2d 308, 310], a suit was brought by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop to enjoin defendants from enforcing a zoning
ordinance which prohibited churches and schools in a certain
residential area. 'rhe court held it would not indulge in a
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presumption that the ". . . exclusion of school and church
from an entire municipality is conducive to public health,
safety, morals or the general welfare, . . . A thesis so inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our free institutions
and system of government and the traditions of the American
people will not be accepted by way of presumption, nor at
all in the absence of competent evidence establishing a real
and substantial relationship between the attempted exclusion
and public health, safety, morals or the general welfare and,
hence, the reasonableness and validity of the restriction upon
use of private property as a legitimate exercise of the state's
police powers.'' In the Mooney case, the facts show that
there, as here, the zoning ordinance had the practical effect
of excluding private schools from the entire community.
In State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn.
363 [37 N.W.2d 370, 371], it was held that a city zoning
ordinance permitting public schools in a residential area while
prohibiting private schools violated the equal protection
clauses of the federal Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. It was noted that a private school has "no effect
upon a residential area different from that of a public or
parochial one." In Lumpkin v. Township Committee of
Bernards Tp., 134 N.J.L. 428 [48 A.2d 798], it was held that
a township zoning ordinance permitting premises in a residential A zone to be used as a school by a church, but prohibiting use of such premises for a private boarding school
for boys, was invalid because it bore no substantial relation
to the public health, morals, safety, or general welfare. It
was also held that such an ordinance denied the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. In Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller,
301 N.Y. 189 [93 N.E.2d 632], it was held that an amendment
to a zoning ordinance which permitted a school in a residential
district after the petitioner had filed the consents of 80 per
cent of the owners of property in the district was invalid
as violative of the due process clauses of the federal and
state Constitutions. Quoting from N ectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 [ 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842], it was
held that "The governmental power to interfere by zoning
regulations with the general rights of the land owner by
restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and
other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it
does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." In State v. Joseph, 139
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, it was held that a zoning
ordinance
churches from a residential district was
not justified for the protection of public health and safety
by preventing increased noise, confusion, traffic congestion
and parking difficulties, or because of the adverse effect on
or for the protection of the public
values of adjacent
morals and welfare. It was held not a proper governmental
function to exclude churches from a residential district of a
municipality in the name of the public for the purpose of
securing benefits of exclusive residential restrictions to adjacent landowners. In State ex r~l. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231 [90 P.2d 217], it was held that a
zoning ordinance requiring the written permission of 75 per
cent of the property owners before a church could be erected
in a residential district was void as violative of the due process
clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.
Respondents contend that the cases from other jurisdictions
are distinguishable from the one under consideration, and
that in many of the sister states the Supreme Courts are as
"anti-zoning as the record of this Court is pro-zoning."
[ 4a] While on the facts, many of the cases may be distinguishable, the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that
an ordinance is invalid which excludes private schools from
an area in which public schools are found is persuasive. It
is difficult to make an argument that private schools are
inimical to the public welfare while public schools are not.
Respondents argue that Piedmont can neither "allow nor
refuse to allow'' public schools in Zone A in that only the
board of education, an agency of the state, has that power.
It is conceded that the wording of the ordinance purports
to permit public schools in the area but that the reality of
the situation is that Piedmont would l1ave no power to exclude
such schools. The question is not here involved whether the
city could enact rPasonable legislation concerning public
schools. In B1dtcrworth v. Boyd, 12 CaL2d 140, 152 [82
P .2d 434, J 26 A.L.R. 838], it was held that "The school
system has been held to be a matter of general concern, rather
than a municipal affair, and consequently is not committed
to the exclusive control of local governments. But the cities
may make local regulations beneficial to and in furtherance
of the school system, provided that these provisions do not
conflict with the general law. (Whitmore v. Brown, 207
CaL 473 [279 P. 447] ; Esberg v. Badaracco, 202 Cal. 110
[259 P. 730] ; Anderson v. Board of Education, 126 Cal.App.
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514
P.2d 744, 16 P.2d 272].)" A comprehensive zoning
ordinance of the city of Los Angeles was held proper where
it involved to some extent a part of the public school system
(Ransom v. Los Angeles City High Sch. Dist., 129 Cal.App.
2d 500 [277 P.2d 455] ). Whether a city could zone to exclude
public schools is not before us now, nor has it been beforr
a court of this state so far as can be ascertained. The only
question before us is whether a
may, constitutionally,
by legislation exclude all private schools from 98.7 per cent
of its total area-which, when the character of the remaining
area is taken into consideration, constitutes an effective
exclusion of private schools from thr entire city.
[5] Respondents argue that a private school will be free
from any control as distinguished from the control exercised
over public schools. This argument is without merit. The
Education Code provides in part ( § 16624) that "Such school
[private] shall be taught in thr English language and shall
offer instruction in the several branches of study required
to be taught in the public sehools of the State. The attendanee
of the pupils shall be kept by private school authorities in
a register, and the record of attendanee shall indicate dearly
every absence of the pupil from sehool for a half day or more
during each day that school is maintained during the year"
Insofar as other regulations in the interest of the public
welfare are concerned, no doubt the city, aeting under its
poliee power, could insure the pn'servation of the public
peace and the preservation of private property.
It is also argued by respondents that the owner of a private
school may, if the ordinance is struek down, loeate the sehool
as dictated by its own welfare and interrsts w·ithout any
control on the part of the city. 'l'his question is not before
us. Each case must be decided on its faets, and before us
we have only the question of a private school to be loeated
adjacent to a Catholic ehureh in the area where public sehools
are found.
[ 4b] Respondents' argument that a private
sehool located in the precise location involved here would be
inimieal to the public welfare is not convincing Respondents
point to no exceptional circumstances concerning the particular location of this partieular school. The state's basie
zoning statute provides that a city "may by ordinanee regulate, restrict and segregate the location of . . . the several
classes of public and semi-public buildings, and the loeation
of buildings or property designed for sp.?ci:fied uses. . . . ''
(Deering's Gen. Laws, 194:3, Act 994, § 2) Artiele XI, sec-
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tion 11, California Constitution, also provides that "Any
county, city, town or township may make and enforce within
its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as arc not in conflict with general laws.''
Respondents place reliance upon the case of Corporat,ion of
Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656
[208 P.2d 828]. in \7hich it ;vas held that by ordinance tlw
city could prohibit all churches in a residential area. That
case is distinguishable from the one under consid<'ration.
Here, only private schools are exeludrd--not all schools as
were all ehnrches in the Pvrterville ea:~e. [G] It is wrll
~ettled that "no law within the broad areas of state interest
may be unreasonably d iser ir,;inatory or arbitrary. 'l'he state's
interest in public education, for example, does not empower
the Legislature to compel school children to receive instruction from public teachers only, for it wonld thereby take
away the right of parents to direct the npbringinL~ and education of children under their control." (Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, supra, 268 U.S. 510, 584, 585.)
Careful examination of the arguments in support of the
legislation in question reveals that thrre is absent the compelling justification which would be needed to sustain discrimination of the naturr here involved.
For the reasons above stated it would appear that the
ordinance here involved i:;; unconstitutional and void brcause
of its arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against
private schools.
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J ., Dissenting.-Hegardless of how beneficial
and desirable we personally may think this partieular school
would be, it is our duty to uniformly apply the law and not,
in order to obtain a result here, set a precedent which will
have the effect of generally opening- residential areas in all
cities to private schools. Tt is particularly important that
we carefully consider and apply the law here because this
case appears to be de:,igned as a test case to set the pattern
for other communities. The attack is directly upon the
classification as between public schools and private schools,
and the impaet of the ordinance upon petitioner's "business
and property." 'rhr TJE'tition for the writ is complc>tely silent
upon whether the ordinance docs or does not provide for
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variances o1· noncou£onmug uses or exceptions, or for administrative procedures in respect thereto, or whether any effort
bas been made to secure an amendment or exception or other
relief.!
The only real iossues in this case are two: (1) The ordinance elassifies schools, for purposes of zoning, as those which
are ''under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of
the City of Piedmont,'' and those which are not so governed.
Is this classification unconstitutional?
) The petitioner attacks the application of the ordinance
to its "business and property," with the charge that "Unless
respondents are compelled . . . to issue to petitioner the
permit which it has requested, and thus authorize the petitioner to construct, erect and establish its proposed school,
p~titioner 's business and property will suffer irreparable
injury.'' Does petitioner sustain this attack 1

Classification
Classifying as between public and private ownership or
management of a service or business is not new. It is elementary that the conduct of a public school is a public service
while the operation of a private school is a private business.
The Constitution of California provides in article IX for
public schools (see also art. XIII, § 15), and in section 15
of ar·ticle XVI declares among other things that the public
school system is ''a matter of general concern inasmuch as
the rducation of the children of the State is an obligation
and function of the State.''
General principles applicable to the classification inherent
in zoning ordinances are that: "[A] zoning ordinance
enacted pursuant to a comprehensive plan of community
development, 'when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in
operation,' will be sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power; every intendment is in favor of its validity, and a
court will not, 'except in a clear case of oppressive and
arbitrary limitation,' interfere with the legislative discretion;
1
The general rule is that "A party aggrieved by the application of
a statute or ordinance must invoke and exhaust the administrative
remedies provided thereby before he may resort to the courts for
relief. l Citations.}" (Metcalf v. County of Los Angeles (1944), 24
CaL2d 267, 26fl [148 P.2d 645]; see also Essick v. City of Los Angeles
(1950), 34 CaU~d 614, 622~623 r213 P.2d 492]; Lockard v. City of Los
Angeles (1949), 33 Cal.2d 4ii3, 4:37 r202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990];
Bcrnstdn v. SmutZ' (1()47), 83 Cai.App.2d 108, 114~11!1 [188 P.2d 48];
City of San Mateo v. Hardy (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 794, 797 [149
P.2d 307].)
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it is
to
of t!IP public health,
safety, morals and
welfare; and though the court may
differ with dw
authorities as to the 'necessity or pro, of the rr;gulatiou, so long as it remains a 'que,tion
upon which reasonablr minds might differ,' there will be
no jwlieial int~:rf('retltt> with th(' municipality's determination
of policy.,.
v.
of Manhattan Bench (1953),
41 Cal.2d
SR5-88G I 264 P.2d 932 j ; Clemons v. City of
Los
( 19:10). :)6 Cal.2d 9il, 98-99 f222 P.2d 4391 : see
also "zoning." 12 CaLTur. 10-Yr.Supp. pp. 166-168. § 25.
and eas<>s ther(c citec!.) "[T]hc establishment, as part of a
compreh\'Hsive and systt>matic [zoning] plan, of districts devoted to strictly private residt>ncc>s or single family dwt>llings,
from which are excluded business or mnltiplt> dwelling structures, is a legitimatt> exercisP of the police power. [Citations.]" (Wilkins v City
San Bernardino (1946), 29
Cal.2d 332, 837-838 [171 P.2d 542]; see also Miller v. Board
of Public Works (1925). 195 Cal. 477, 490-491 [234 P. 371];
Cm·poration of Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville (1949),
90 CaLApp.2d 65G. 659 r208 P.2d 823].)
It appears clear that the classification-as between private
and pub! ic schools---attacked b_v petitiont>r in the ordinance
here involved has not be('n shown to bt> such that reasonable
minds may not c!iffer conc-erning it. The city of Piedmont,
a small city with a total area of approximately 1152 acres
and a population of less than 12,000. is an "island" entirely
surrounded by the city of Oakland. In 1929 a comprehensive
zoning ordinanct> was adopted, dividing- the city into four
zones designated as Zones A. B, C. and D, rrspeetively. As
amended in 1936, but prior to the time petitioner acquired
its property here involv('d, section 3 of the ordinance provides
that "No building . . . shall bt> erected . . . in Zone 'A',
whic-h is . . intended to be occupied or used for any purpose
other than a single family dwelling. church, or public school
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of the City
of Piedmont . . . '' The zoning provision which thus bans
private schools from the single family residential Zone A,
was approved by a vote ( 3,408 to 1,285) of the electors of
the city. Zone A embraces approximately 1137.14 acres.
including the land here involved upon which petitioner desires
to construct and operate a private school. Such schools are
permitted in the other three zones.
As establishing pt>titioner 's failure to show invalidity of
the ordinance, it may be pointed out m the first place that
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although the majority opinion declares that the only question
involved in this controversy is "\Vhether the city of Piedmonl
may, by [a comprehensive zoning] ordinance, constitutionally
prevent the constrnclion of a building to be used for private
school purposes in an area [a si:r..gle family residential zone)
where public scllools are located,'' it appears to be conceded
petitioner for the writ that the city does not have power
or the legal right to exclude public schools, which are nndPr
the jurisdiction of the board of education, from its single
family residential Zone A, which is here involved.
(See
Cal. Const., art. IX; sec also Butterworth v. Boyrl ( 1938),
12 Cal.2d 140, 152 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838] : Gerth v.
Dorn.inguez (1934), 1 Cal.2d 239, 242 [84 P.2d 135]: Ward v.
San Diego Sch. Dist. (1928), 203 Cal. 712. 715-717 [265 P.
821]; Esber·g v. Badaraeco (1927), 202 Cal. llO, ll5-119 [259
P. 730] .) A public school district has the power of eminent domain and may be allowed, by condemnation, in a prop<'r cas(~,
to acquire property for a school site. (See e.g., Long Beach
City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart ( 1947), 30 Cal.2d 763 [ 185 P.2d
585, 173 A.L. R. 249] ; State ex rel. B1·itton v. Mttlloy ( 1933),
332 :Mo. 1107 [61 S.W.2d 741].) It follows that, as contended
by the city, if it is without power to exclude public schools
from Zone A, then its zoning ordinance which excludes privatc>
but not public schools from that zone cannot fairly be held
to invalidly discriminate against private and in favor of
public schools. The general dassification as between public
schools and private schools is set up by the Constitution
itself. 2 'l'hus it seems indisputable that the classification here
involved is not, as such, vulnerable to petitioner's attack.
'See Constitution of California, article IX: "Sec. 5. 'rhe Legislature shall proYide for a system of common schools by which a free
school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six
months in every year, after the first year in whic.h a school has been
established.
''Sec. 6. . . . 'l'he Public School System shall include all kindergarten
schools, elementary schools, secondary schools, technie.al schools, and
state colleges, established in accordance with law and, in addition,
the school districts and the other agencies authorized to maintain
them. No school or college or any other part of the Public School
System shall be, directly or indirectly, transferred from the Public
School System or placed under the jurisdiction of any authority other
than one included within the Public School System . . . .
"Sec. 8. No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support
of any sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under
the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools; nor shall
any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction
thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common
schools of this State."
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Turning now to thr application of the ordinance under the
circumstances of the case and as affecting
's "business and property," the following defects in its ease appear:
It has not been established as a fact that there are no adequate
arras in which private schools may be built which would be
accessible to residents (either children or adults)
of Piedmont. As alrrady stated, Piedmont, a
small city, is entirely surrounded by the
of Oakland.
and. further, petitioner's property is actually bounded on
one side by a bonlevard which is entirely within Oakland.
'flms, not only has it been here shown that there arc
matdy 15 acres of land within Piedmont which are outside
residential Zone A and upon which private schools are per·
mitted under the zoning ordinance, but it has not been show!"!
that there is no available and reasonably accessible land
within the surrounding city of Oakland npon which private
schools are permitted. It seems obvious, therefore, that petitioner has failed to establi~h either that it is being oppressively
and arbitrarily prevented from operating a private school
catering to residents of Piedmont, or that Piedmont residents
are being prevented from attending private schools; those
wishing to attend, or to send their children to, private schools
may, so far as appears, utilize such schools in Oakland or
elsewhere in the San Francisco Bay area as it may be presumed they have done in the past. Furthermore, there is a
complete absence of showing of an attempt by the city of
Piedmont or by any other governmental unit to compel
attendance at public schools only, or to take away the rigl1t
of any parents to direct the upbringing or edueation of
children under their control. Whether or not any particular
property owner is or is not permitted to carry out his desires
for future> development of his particular property into a
private school obviously has no bearing upon the rights of
either adults or children to attend private schools.
(See
Corporation of Presidmg Bishop v. City of Portervnzc ( 1949),
supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 656, 660.)
In the next place, Piedmont, under the terms of its freeholders' charter, is ''primarily a residential city,'' and has
been recognized as such by tbis court. (Reynolds v. Barrett
(1938), 12 Cal.2d 244. 246, 249 [83 P.2d 29].) It is stipulated that petitioner's projected school would not be under
the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of the city of
Piedmont, but would be "owned and operated by petitioner"
and would be constructed and operated next door to land on
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a Roman Catholic
and a rectory occupied
of said Chureh ·who serve Corpus Christi Parish
in the Archdiocese of San Francisco of such Church." Thus
it is indicated the proposed private school would draw pupils
not only from Piedmont but from surrounding San ~'rancisco
Bay area communities, whereas,
only Piedmont
children attend public schools located in that
If the
is compelled to permit petitionrr 's contemplated private
then it would seem that it will be
compelled
to permit other private schools in its single family residential
zone. 'l'hat is, it must permit all private schools to enter
unless this court is prepared to examine and censor
or itself prescribe the projected curriculum, or other basis
of elassification, of each private school which proposes to
construct a building and playground and commence business
in Piedmont's Zone A. It is elerrwntary that '' 'fhe power
of the legislature to impose restrictions on a lawful calling
must b'~ exercised in conformity with the constitutional requirement that such restrictions must operate equally upon
all persons pursuing the same business or profession under
the same circumstances . . . . Hence, if a statute allows one
class of persons to engage in what is presumptively a legitimate business while denying such right to others, it must
be based upon some principle which may reasonably promote
the public health, safety, or welfare." (11 Am.Jur. 10461047, § 285.) This court cannot in good conscience create a
classification which it could not sustain if created by the
Legislature.
A list provided by property owners opposing petitioner
in this proceeding, of the various private schools taken from
the classified section of the San Francisco Bay area telephone
directories shows at least 176 private schools, including among
others, schools affiliated with various religious groups/; driving
"Among the names listed are: Baptist Divinity School, Holy Names
School, Our Lady of Perpetual Help School, :M:t. St. Joseph's School,
Hcdecmer Lutheran School, Seventh Day Adventist School, West
Portal Lutheran School, Zion Lutheran Church and School, St. Anne's
School, St. Anthony's School, St. Augustine's School, St. Boniface
School, St. Brigid School, St. Charles School, St. Dominic's School,
St. Elizabeth's School, St. Emydius School, St. GabTiel School, St.
Ignatius High School, St. .James Boys School, St. John Lutheran
School, St. Mary's Chinese Day School, St. Mary's Chinese Language
School, St. Paul's Grammar School, St. Paul's High School, St. Philip's
School, St. Stephens School, St. Vincent de Paul School, St. Vincent's
High School, St. Columba School, St. John's School, St ..Joseph High
School, St. Joseph's Grammar School, St. Lawrence 0'1'oole School,
and St. Mary's School.

340

RoMAN CATH. ETO. CoRP.

v.

CrTY OF' PIED:\10NT

[45

C.2d

schools, language schools, astrology schools, bartending schools,
real estate schools, divinity schools, nursery schools, furniture
finishing schools, radio schools, labor schools, beauty culture
schools, mechanical arts schools, Swedish massage schools, secretarial schools, television schools, success schools, engineering
schools, fencing schools, dancing schools, sewing schools, charm
schools, dramatic schools, and finishing schools-to name but
a few. Presumptively each of such private schools operates
lawfully and furnishes instruction which to substantial segments of the population has some special value and desirability
over and above instrurtion furnished in public schools. Some
or all of the subjects taught in public schools could, of course,
be included in the curriculum of the private schools, if the
court deems that important as a basis for classification.
If the city of Piedmont is obliged by this court to permit
petitioner to devote its property to private school purposes,
in violation of the city's zoning ordinance, then the conclusion
appears indubitably to follow that the city's doors must likewise be opened, upon demand of any other interested property
owner, to any or all other private schools which in the manner
of their operation are no more obnoxious to the public peace
or quiet, or inherently unlawful, than the school herein authoriz<'d, all to the substantial, if not utter, subversion of the
planned residential character of Zone A. Zoning ordinances
permitting parochial or church schools but prohibiting other
private schools in residential districts haYe been held arbitrary, capricious, and invalid in State v. Northwestern Preparatory School (1949), 228 Minn. 363 [37 N.W.2d 370, 371),
and Lumplc1:n v. Townsluip Committee of Bernar'ds Tp. ( 1946),
134 N.J .L. 428 [ 48 A.2d 798]. Certainly this court cannot
discriminate either in favor of, or against, a private school
because of a religious affiliation or sponsorship, nor can this
conrt properly undertake to censor or prescribe the curriculum
of any lawfully conducted school, whether public or private.
Freedom in the field of education is one of the basically
protected rights (Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), 268
H.S. 510. 535 [ 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R.
468]; lJJ:eyer v. State of Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390 [43
f1Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446]), but this does
not mean that a private school is, as to location, immune
from the application of comprehensive zoning ordinances.
The majority opinion states, but does not attempt to answer,
the cogent factors which may have moved the city council
and the electors to approve the exclusion of private schools
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from the residential zone. The very statement of such factors
-the character of the district, the relativity of its surroundings, its school age population, the availability of other property, the conservation of property values, matters affecting
traffic control, size of streets, parking, noise, fire protection,
overburdening of water mains and sewers, and the peace,
comfort and quiet of the district for residential purposesdemonstrates that reasonable minds might differ as to the
necessity or propriety of the regulation, and that therefore
there should be no judicial interference with the municipality's determination. That such factors are legitimate considerations in the establishment and maintenance of residential districts is not open to dispute, under the zoning principles
established in this state. (See Gov. Code, § 38695, formerly
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 994, § 2; Miller v. Board of Public
Works ( 1925), supra, 195 Cal. 477, 492-494; Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville (1949), supra, 90
Cal.App.2d 656, 659-661.)
Surely the inherent differences between public schools on
the one hand and those privately operated on the other
furnishes clear support for the application by the municipality of the factors enumerated above. For one thing, there
are many more private than public schools; many are operated
under religious and many under secular domination and the
manner of their operation may be as varied as the subjects
they teach. In State v. Sinar (1954), 267 Wis. 91 [65 N.W.2d
43, 47], the court in upholding an ordinance which permitted
public schools and private elementary schools in a residential
zone but excluded private high schools, pointed out that
although public and private schools may perform like functions in some respects, nevertheless the public school serves
the surrounding area without discrimination, whereas the
private school, whether or not sectarian, does not. "The
private school imposes on the community all the disadvantages of the public school but does not compt:nsate the community in the same manner or to the same extent. If the
private school does not make the same contribution to public
welfare this difference may be taken into consideration by
the legislative body in framing its ordinance." (P. 47 of
65 NW.2d.) Further, it appears that the elected Board
of Education of the city of Piedmont, which is directly responsive to the people, is required to consult and advise with
"the planning commission having jurisdiction of" property
proposed to be acquired for new public school sites. See
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Ed. Code, § 18403.) Standards for su;:;h sites are established
the State Department of Edueation.
§ 18402.) No
such control can be exercised by the city over ihe location
of private schools, if it is compelled to
petitioner the
building permit here sought.
another ground is shown
for the reasonable exercise
of its
to determine
policy, and
one upon which a
reasonable mind eould say the regulation h<:re in eontroycrsy
is at least fairly debatable-and therefore not to be judicially
overthrown.

Irreparable Injury to Petitioner's
Business and Property
The record shows that petitioner acquired the land concerned in July, 1954-some 18 years after 4 the anwndmcnt
of the zoning ordinance to ban priyatc sehools from Zone A ;
the last prior owner of the lal1(1 was 'l'he Homan Catholic
Archbishop of San Francisco, a California corporation sole.
The same corporation sole owns additional, adjoining, land
on which "are a Roman Catholic Church, and a rectory occupied by priests of said Church who serve Corpus Christi
Parish in the Archdiocese of San Francisco of such Church."
The school building which petitioner seeks to construct would
have dimensions of 204 feet by 65 feet and an area of 13,260
square feet; .in addition petitioner's land has an area of some
16,240 square feet "which is available for incidental andjor
school playground uses.''
Petitioner's land along its east boundary fronts upon the
west side of Park Boulevard, all of which boulcvard in that
area lies within the corporate limits of the city of Oakland
and not within the city of Piedmont. Adjacent to petitioner's
land is a "residential area known as 'St. James ·wood,' which
comprise;;; approximately 227 building sites, all of which are
restricted, by restrictions of record, to single family residences; the owners of said property have formed and are
members of an association known as 'St. ,James Wood Homes
Association.' If a witness were called for city of Piedmont
he would testify that at a meeting of the members of said
Association, held ,J nne 15, 19G4, said members voted ( 170 to
2) objection to the granting of a permit for the building of
petitioner's proposed school."
It thus is shown that petitioner's land was acquired by

•see Village of Euclid v. Amb?er Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365
[47 S.Ot. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, .54 A.L.R. 1016]; Jones v. City of Los
Angeles (1930), 211 Cal. 304, 318-321 [295 P. 14.].
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advance
that such land lies in a single
residential zone, and, furthrr, that the adjacent land
within the
of Piedmont is used for single family residential, rather than for private business, purposes. Under
such circumstances no support is found for petitioner's assertion of ''irreparable
'' to its business and property
if it does not sectue the
school building permit it
seeks.
In Wilkins v. C·ity of San Bernardino ( 1946), supra, 29
Cal.2d 332. 340, this court said that ''An examination of the
California decisions discloses that the eases in which zoning
ordinances have been held invalid and unr<~asonable as applied to particular property fall roughly into four categories:
1. Where the zoning ordinance attempts to exclude and prohibit existing and established uses or businesses that are
not nuisances. [Citations.] 2. Vlhere the restrictions create
a monopoly. [Citations.] 3. Where the use of adjacent property renders the land entirely unsuited to or unusable for
the only pt:.rpose permitted by the ordinance. [Citation.]
4. \Vhere a small parcel is restricted and given less rights than
the surrounding property, as where a lot in the center of a
business or commercial district is limited to use for residential purposes, thereby creating an 'island' in the middle
of a larger area devoted to other uses. [Citations.] ''
Petitioner has alleged no facts showing, and makes no
effort to support a elaim, that the present case falls into
any of the categories above listed, but merely alleges generally
that "Unless respondents are compelled . . . to issue to
petitioner the permit which it has requested and, thus authorize the petitioner to construct, erect and establish its proposed school, petitioner's business and property will suffer
irreparable injury." The law is settled, however, that "The
mere fact that. some hardship may be experienced is not
material, for ' [ e] very exercise of the police power is apt
to affect adversely the property interest of somebody.' "
(Clemons v. City of Los Angeles (1950), supra, 36 Cal.2d
95, 99; Zahn v. Board of Pttblic Works (1925), 195 Cal. 497,
503 [234 P. 388].) "\Vhere it is claimed that the ordinance
is unreasonable as applied to plaintiff's property, or that
a change in conditions has rendered application of the ordinance unreasonable, it is incumbent on plaintiff to produce
sufficient evidence from which the court can make such findings as to the physical facts involved as will justify it in
concluding, as a matter of law, that the ordinance is un-
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reasonable and invalid. It is not sufficient for him to show
that it will be more profitable to him to make other use of his
property, or that such other use will not cause injury to the
public, but he must show an abuse of discretion on the part
of the zoning authorities and that there has been an unreasonable and unwarranted exercise of the police power.
[Citation.]" (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino (1946).
supra, 29 Cal.2d 332, 338.) " [I] t must be shown that there
has been an unreasonable, oppressive, or unwarranted interference with property rights in the exercise of the police
power before a zoning ordinance can be held invalid [ citations] . . . The burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish
the invalidity of the ordinance and its application to the
property involved. The plaintifi"s failure to sustain this
burden raises a presumption of the existence of sueh faets as
are sufficient to sustain the ordinance. [Citation.] " (Be t•erly
Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1953), 40 Cal.2d 552, 559
[254 P.2d 865].)
If we conform to the principles above stated the writ sought
should be denied.
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied November 23, 1955. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

